The role of government in forming and coordinating R&D consortia has often been cited in studies of the economic success of latecomer countries such as Korea and Japan. Most previous studies documented the government's efforts to provide funding. In our research about the government's role in determining the quality of innovation, we develop a computational model based on genetic algorithms. The two main aspects of government involvement explored in this study are 1) the timing of evaluation of participating firms in a consortium, and 2) the form that these consortia take. In terms of the timing of evaluation, we find that continuous evaluation is consistently superior to early evaluation. In addition, the effect of the form of the consortium depends on the timing of evaluation. An inverse pyramid arrangement, which emphasizes variation at the beginning of the innovation process, outperforms a pyramid-form arrangement only when evaluation is continuous. We identify the tension and reconciliation between diversity and selection as the force underlying the results of this study. We discuss these findings and their implications for how governments should balance diversity and selection when designing innovation systems.
Introduction: the role of government in governmentcoordinated R&D consortia
The purpose of this article is to examine the role of government in formation and coordination of R&D consortia by modeling the process from an evolutionary perspective (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Devezas, 2005) . In particular, we modify genetic algorithms to model different possible forms of government-coordinated R&D consortia (Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 2000; Devezas, 2005) . According to Aldrich and Sasaki (1995) , the government's involvement with R&D consortia may be minimal, they may contribute funding, or they may coordinate projects. We focus on the third role, in which government officials or agencies choose to participate in the life of the consortium by allocating tasks to firms and orchestrating the within-consortium innovation process. We use the term "government-coordinated R&D consortia" in order to differentiate from "government-sponsored R&D consortia". Unlike the current study, in most studies of government-sponsored R&D consortia (e.g., Sakakibara, 1997; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002) , samples were limited to projects in which the cooperation of private firms was vital to the consortium's success (e.g., the VLSI, or Very Large Scale Integrated circuit project in Japan). Thus, previous studies focused on R&D consortia in which, although government financial support was present, voluntary cooperation among participating firms was essential. In our study, government decision-making determines whom to include in the consortium and how tasks are allocated; thus, the government is more directly involved, which affects the extent of the consortium's success.
Government-coordinated R&D consortia are highly relevant to economies, particularly in "latecomer countries" such as Korea and Japan (Cho et al., 1998; Choi, 1986; Lee, 1988) . In these countries, the collaboration within government-coordinated Technological Forecasting & Social Change 88 (2014) 202-215 R&D consortia is important in aggregating and consolidating potentially fragmented R&D efforts at the national level. For example, the government initiated and coordinated the development of High Definition TV (HDTV) technology in Japan and the commercialization of CDMA (Code Division Multi-Access) technology in Korea. Although the role of government in sponsoring and coordinating R&D consortia is reported to have declined in the mid-1990s (Sakakibara, 1997) , it retained importance in newly emerging sectors such as large-scale renewable energy in both developed and developing countries (Mah et al., 2013) . For example, the Japanese government established NEDO (the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), a quasi-governmental organization, to promote the development of new energy technologies with an annual budget of 121.1 billion yen 1 (Kajikawa et al., 2008) . The South Korean government, noting the importance of nano-technology for scientific competiveness and economic prosperity, has been aggressively promoting nano-science technology since the late 1990s by establishing and executing the National Comprehensive Development Plan of Nanotechnology (NCDPN) . As a result of the nationally coordinated effort, Korea came to rank the highest in the amount of R&D expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) only three years after its inception. In terms of the output, the level of nanotechnology in Korea reached 75% of that in the United States as of 2008 from 25% in 2001 (Kim, 2010) . Other performance measures such as number of SCI papers published, number of patent registrations recently show that Korea has become one of the leading nations in this area (Bae et al., 2013) . This example testifies to the potentially important roles of a government in forming and orchestrating R&D consortia.
Despite its importance, most previous studies of R&D consortia excluded cases with heavy government involvement (Sakakibara, 1997) . Thus, the role of government in government-coordinated R&D consortia, in which government involvement is much more direct than in other types of consortia, is understudied. 2 From an evolutionary perspective, the characteristics of government-coordinated R&D consortia are intriguing. Often innovation is viewed as a social evolutionary process involving a sequence of variation, selection, and retention (VSR, hereafter) (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Van de Ven and Garud, 1994) . Other innovation models such as the A-U model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) and Tushman and Anderson's (1986) model assume the existence of the VSR process to a certain degree in their models as well. Especially for emerging technologies, a certain degree of variation at the early stage seems to be inevitable due to the uncertain nature of technical change. In government-coordinated R&D consortia, however, the innovation process differs from a natural evolution in an important way: the government manages the VSR process, creating and orchestrating innovation artificially rather than relying on natural social forces.
Because of this difference, participants in governmentcoordinated R&D consortia potentially enjoy several benefits that participants in natural evolutionary processes do not. First, depending on the needs of the agents involved and the level of urgency, the VSR process may be expedited in government-coordinated consortia. Through the planning and engineering of government agents, a governmentcoordinated innovation can bypass many procedures that would normally require more time. Secondly, a governmentcoordinated consortium can avoid many of the normal processes involved in VSR, where variation is emphasized and created in the early stages. Governments in latecomer countries successfully develop new industries by investing heavily in a small number of firms and R&D institutions at the beginning of an innovation cycle rather than increasing product variation or the number of consortia participants. In fact, by implementing a reversed VSR model (in other words, by starting with a few firms and R&D institutions and focusing on variation at the later stage of commercialization), firms in government-coordinated consortia can focus on development of certain technologies, though this involves a high level of risk. By reducing the level of competition in the early stages, consortia participants can avoid redundant investment and concentrate their resources. For example, the South Korean government intervened in the process of developing the CDMA technology by allowing one institution (ETRI: the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute) to develop the commercialization technology and limiting licensing to a small number of firms (Wang and Kim, 2007) . Recently, a similar pattern was evident in the process of developing the LTE-A (Long Term Evolution-Advanced) technology. Thirdly, government-coordinated consortia can avoid the early selection myopia that results in overlooking of potentially promising innovations. When the performance of a technology is expected to be unstable over time, population-level, market-driven selection forces may favor technologies with potentially superior long-run performance (Levinthal and Posen, 2007) . Government intervention may protect technologies from these selection forces, allowing the consortium to realize long-term benefits.
To maximize these potential benefits in governmentcoordinated R&D consortia, the government must be capable of making sound decisions in evaluation and selection of consortium participants, configuration of the consortium, and management of knowledge flow within the consortium (i.e., selecting "upstream technologies" for transfer or dissemination). In this study, we focus on the first two aspects. In particular, we ask the following three questions: 1) should governments evaluate and select consortium participants at the time of consortium formation, or should participants be added as the evolution of the technology unfolds? (i.e., the timing of evaluation); 2) should variation be encouraged early or late in the evolutionary process? (i.e., the form of the consortium); and 3) what is the effect of these two decision-making dimensions in combination? (i.e., the interaction between timing of evaluation and form of the consortium).
In order to provide a context to the questions we are proposing, consider NCDPN of South Korea. As a part of the nation-level effort, in 2008, the Ministry of Education and Science Technology of Korea announced "The National Nano-Technology Roadmap" in which the future trends of 1 http://www.nedo.go.jp/english/introducing_pja.html. 2 One of the few exceptions is Tripsas et al. (1995) in which the role of government in preventing opportunistic behaviors among participating firms within consortia is discussed. Another rare exception is Bard et al. (1999) in which the idea of "bubble planning" is used for designing consortia.
major technology areas are detailed. The purpose of the roadmap is to help the government and the private sector in planning and investing. Fig. 1 is a roadmap of the nano-sensor device technology area, one of many areas where the government initially set their focus on.
There are several notable features in this map. First, there are performance measures that can be used throughout multiple phases. In the three sequential phases (material developmentperformance improvementstabilizing production), the sensor array measure is used across multiple areas and phases. This implies that a multi-stage R&D consortium was formed to solve the same problem. As we will discuss further in the modeling section, the type of R&D problem we are interested in is a similar one: multiple R&D participants are sequentially formed to provide a better answer to a single problem. Second, while the roadmap shows the pace and strategy of how the field would evolve, it does not provide any guide as to the issues we are interested in. After the careful review of the NCDPN's planning documents, we concluded that the government either does not consider the timing of evaluation and formation very carefully at the initial stage of planning or makes related decisions in an ad hoc fashion as the R&D consortia progresses based on the premise that planning does not contain information on these two issues. In any case, our analysis can shed light on these issues that can have potentially significant impact to the quality of innovation output. For example, with regard to the timing of evaluation, the government can select all the participants at the beginning or select sequentially as each phase is completed. With regard to the form of the consortium, the government can allocate more resources and participants either at an earlier or a later phase. In the next section, we provide background information about our modeling approach and outline the model in detail.
The model and its background
We use genetic algorithms (GA hereafter), a type of computational modeling approach well-suited for modeling of innovation processes, to model the innovation process in an R&D consortium (Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 2000) . We decided to do computer-based simulations because GA, the model platform of our choice, is particularly suitable for modeling consortia-based innovation. The key element of GA-based innovation modeling is cross-fertilization among boundedly rational actors (Goldberg, 2000) . The main purpose of forming an R&D consortium is to help multiple limited, yet capable, actors to exchange their ideas to reach a better solution. A computer-based simulation is a natural choice for GA-based modeling. To minimize the concerns surrounding computational approaches (e.g., Garbage-in-2006 Garbage-in- -2008 Garbage-in- 2009 Garbage-in- -2011 Garbage-in- 2012 Garbage-in- -2014 Garbage-in- 2015 Garbage-in- -2017 Garbage-in- 2018 Garbage-in- -2020 Global garbage-out), we choose a well-established model and modify it to incorporate the behavioral patterns we are interested in (i.e., knowledge transfer from early to late generations). While we believe our GA-based model captures important elements of consortia-based innovation, other modelseither computation or analyticalcan definitely complement our results. We first describe how we modify the original genetic algorithms to model a government-coordinated R&D consortium. Then we describe the contribution of government in selecting participating firms and configuring R&D consortia in various forms.
Research consortia in a GA framework
After Holland's (1975) introduction of the GA modeling method, Goldberg (1983) used it to solve a complex real-life problem: control of gas pipeline systems. Since then, the GA method has been used in many instances where conventional optimization methods do not perform well or innovative solutions are required (Goldberg, 2000) . We therefore follow this method to model innovation processes in governmentcoordinated R&D consortia. In this study, an individual solution (i.e., a chromosome) represents a solution proposed by a firm or research institution (e.g., a University) within the consortium. These organizations interact, or, in GA terminology, cross over with each other to produce a solution to an innovation problem.
The most notable difference in our model from typical models using the GA approach is the way offspring are created and existing solutions are replaced with the offspring. In a vertical form of research consortium (Sakakibara, 2001; Carayannis and Alexander, 2004) , different firms are responsible for different stages of the innovation process. Thus, instead of assuming that an initial population of firms is created and offspring continuously replace the existing population, we assume that different firms or institutions are responsible for different tasks within the innovation stream (i.e., early-stage organizations are responsible for basic research, while late-stage organizations are responsible for commercialization technology). Furthermore, we assume that a type of crossover takes place between early-and late-stage firms. We also assume multiple generations within the innovation process, the first-generation firms passing down their knowledge to the next generation, and the second generation passing down to the third, and so on. Thus, we envision a set of firms sequentially placed along a time continuum, contributing to the solving of a problem collectively at different stages. 3 Fig. 2 visually illustrates how inter-generational knowledge transmission takes place within a context of nano-biosensor technology. A single firm is placed in each generation and knowledge component (represented in difference colors for each generation) of an earlier firm are transferred to the next generation. The plus signs indicate two corresponding knowledge sets (i.e., chromosomes or solutions) which cross over to produce a new knowledge set (i.e., offspring).
We formally define our model as follows.
Objective function
The objective of firms participating in the research consortium is to match the "reality" (March, 1991; Fang et al., 2010) . The reality can be interpreted as the form of innovation output that best matches consumer preferences or provides the most successful output. The objective of firms in the research consortium is to match the reality as closely as possible. The reality is denoted by R, and the elements of its m-dimensional vector are denoted by {r 1 , r 2 , …, r m }. Each element of the vector can take a value of either 0 or 1. These values are randomly assigned to each of m dimensions.
Firm representation
Firms are represented according to their knowledge about the reality. They are assumed to be aware of the existence of m-dimensions about which decisions must be made. Thus, we represent firms with an m-dimensional vector X = {x 1 , x 2 , …, x m } as well. Consistent with the reality, each element of X can take a binary value. In the initial stage, binary values are randomly assigned in each of the m dimensions.
Population of firms in the research consortium
We assume that G sequential generations are required in order to complete an innovation process. In each of these generations, the potential number of participating firms is represented by N. Thus, we assume a population of N × G firms. X ij represents the firm placed in the jth position in the ith generation where i ∈ {1,…, G} and j ∈ {1,…, N}. An R&D consortium is a subset of firms from this population. The government chooses firms from this population to be included in the consortium (see Section 4.2 for more detail). Chosen firms transmit their knowledge to the nextgeneration firms.
Performance and perceived performance
As mentioned earlier, the innovation performance of a firm is a function of how many digits out of m dimensions match the reality. Let P(X ij ) denote the performance of the jth firm in the ith generation with knowledge X. P(X ij ) is represented as follows:
where δ k = 1 if x k corresponds with reality on the same dimension; δ k = 0 otherwise. The ultimate performance measure of interest in the final innovation output of the research consortium, that is, the highest performance of all firms in the last generation. Because a research consortium can terminate its innovation activity before the innovation throughput reaches the final stage, we also document the highest performance of all firms in mid-generation. Now we incorporate uncertainty or inaccuracy in performance evaluation by introducing perceived performance. Let Φ(X ij ) denote the perceived performance of the jth firm in the ith generation with knowledge X by the government and s denote how inaccurate or uncertain the performance information the government receives is when evaluating and choosing the consortium participants. Φ(X ij ) is represented as follows:
where δ k = 1 if x k corresponds with reality on the same dimension; δ k = 0 otherwise. When s = 1, for every dimension of X ij that matches the reality, one additional point in performance is obtained. In other words, for every correct move, there is a positive feedback received by the government. As s increases, receiving an accurate feedback for a correct bit becomes increasingly difficult. Consider the case where s = 2. For the first dimension (i.e., k = 1) to gain a point, both the first and the second dimensions have to be correct. For the mth dimension, the mth dimension as well as the first dimension has to be correct. In other words, the last and the first dimension are connected. When s = m, the problem becomes a "needle-in-a-haystack" search problem (Hinton and Nowlan, 1987) where it is extremely difficult to receive a positive feedback even if only one out of m dimensions is wrong. We believe that a situation with high s captures an early stage of an innovation process. Because of a high level of uncertainty about how the innovation process would unfold, it is difficult to receive an accurate feedback. This uncertainty tends to decrease as the trajectory of technology becomes more visible and clear. In our analysis, we consider two separate cases: (1) there is no uncertainty throughout (s = 1 in all generations);
(2) there is a high level of uncertainty in the beginning and the level of uncertainty gradually decreases.
Knowledge transmission
As mentioned earlier, firms transmit their knowledge to other firms in the next generation. 4 Each firm in the i + 1th generation chooses a parent firm from the ith generation. While multiple ways of linking an offspring firm in the i + 1th generation and a parent in the ith generation may exist, we model offspring firms to choose a firm from its parent generation randomly. If the number of firms in the subsequent generation is higher than that in the current generation, multiple firms may transmit their knowledge to the next generation. Specific matching rules (e.g., highperforming parents transmit their knowledge to highperforming offspring) can, of course, be modeled and their impact on consortium performance examined. However, the effect of different patterns of firm connection on performance is not within the scope of our study.
Once a match is formed, actual knowledge transmission takes place. We slightly modify the uniform crossover mechanism in order to model knowledge transmission. In the uniform crossover mechanism, a critical probability P 0 is determined and two parent chromosomes (chromosomes 1 and 2) from the population are chosen. Then, for each of m-dimensions, a random number is created from the uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1. If the random number is larger than or equal to P 0 , the value from chromosome 1 is chosen and used in the corresponding digit of the offspring; if the random number is lower than P 0 , the value from chromosome 2 is chosen. In our modified model, if a random number is larger than or equal to P 0 , the value from the parent firm's knowledge is copied to the corresponding digit in the offspring's knowledge. If not, the offspring maintains its original knowledge bit. Fig. 3 shows an example. -2008 2009-2011 2012-2014 2015-2017 2018-2020 
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The role of government
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the two roles a government can play in government-coordinated R&D consortia: choosing the timing of evaluation and determining the form of the consortium. In terms of the timing of consortia formation, the government can choose firms either at the initial stages of innovation or continuously as the innovation unfolds. In the case of initial evaluation, the government chooses firms from each generation based on their initial performance (i.e., before any knowledge transmission takes place). For the continuous evaluation case, the government chooses participants as knowledge transmission unfolds. More specifically, the chosen firms in the ith generation transmit their knowledge to all firms in the i + 1th generation. In other words, all firms in the i + 1th generation randomly choose firms from among those chosen by the government in the prior generation and cross over with their knowledge. Because the consortium boundaries open up to allow new knowledge to flow in, the continuous evaluation case can be thought of as a partially open system. A more detailed description of the differences in timing of evaluation is provided in Section 4.2.
The second responsibility of government is to determine the form of the consortium. If the government chooses to reduce variation in the early stages of innovation, a small number of firms will be included in earlier generations and a large number of firms in later generations. Graphically speaking, the shape of the research consortium will then resemble a pyramid. If the government chooses to emphasize variation early, the consortium takes the form of an inverse pyramid. Fig. 4 illustrates these two cases graphically.
As the number of participants increases both in pyramid and inverse pyramid formation, the task volume and variety that the consortium participants have to deal with will also increase. This, in turn will affect the performance of the consortium participants since the capacity to deal with this task variety and volume will vary among these participants. We recognize that in reality, this will affect the actual performance of the consortium participants. Furthermore, time required to complete an innovation process in a consortium may vary. In general, the ratio of consortiaparticipants working on tasks not directly related to the innovation process would increase towards the end of the innovation cycle. This near-end-delay due to noneinnovative activities would be multiplied with more consortia participants. Following this line of thought, we can expect that the pyramid arrangement would require more coordination and time towards the end and therefore is more costly. However, in this paper, we decided to leave these issues out since incorporating this issue in the model will also increase the complexity of our model and we want to focus on the role of government decision-making in the R&D consortium.
Implementation
For the results presented below, we use the following parameters. First, to clarify the formation of the pyramid or inverse pyramid arrangement, we set G = N. Under this condition, formation of a pyramid shape is simple: a single firm is included in the first generation, and one firm is added for each subsequent generation. For formation of the inverse pyramid, N firms are included in the first generation, and the pool is reduced by one firm for each subsequent generation. As long as the general shape of either arrangement is preserved, the results are not sensitive to whether G = N or not. Thus, we set G = N = 10. The number of knowledge dimensions (m) is set at 10. This parameter captures the degree of complexity of the problem to be solved. If m is small, the research consortium generally converges to the perfect knowledge level quickly. Critical probability (P 0 ) for crossover is set at 0.5. This value captures a moderate level of knowledge transmission from earlier generations. While slow or fast transmission influences the level of performance, the general pattern does not depend on P 0 . All the results presented in this study are based on 10,000 independent runs. Offspring after crossover: a j k d e n g p Note: 1) P 0 = 0.5 2) For the sake of illustration, we use alphabetical values. In the actual model, binary values were used. Fig. 3 . An example of knowledge transmission note: 1) P 0 = 0.5. 2) For the sake of illustration, we use alphabetical values. In the actual model, binary values were used.
Results
The baseline case: random selection
We first consider the case with no uncertain feedback (s = 1). As a baseline case, we run the case in which the government randomly chooses participating firms in the initial period. In other words, evaluation of potential participants is random. Fig. 5 reports the results. Along with the performance measure of the consortium over time (i.e., the best performance of each generation), we report the average performance of each generation. This measure is meaningful in the following sense. In our model, firms in the i + 1th generation are randomly matched to firms in the ith generation and knowledge is obtained from them.
Since we do not model a particular pattern of matching between generations (see Section 4.1.5), the specific quality of knowledge passed down from earlier generations is not known. Thus, by averaging each generation's knowledge quality, we can infer the average level of quality to be passed down to the next generation.
As evident in Fig. 5a , the value for average knowledge in the random evaluation case is consistently at the 50% level. No significant difference is observed between the pyramid and inverse pyramid arrangements. Given the random nature of the choice, this result is understandable.
The maximum performance of each generation exhibits quite different patterns in the pyramid and inverse pyramid cases (Fig. 5b) . The first observation is the symmetric nature of the two curves. If one of the two curves is rotated around
(a) Inverse Pyramid (b) Pyramid
Note: Circles near the top denote early-generation firms.
Inverse Pyramid vs. Pyramid Shape Firm Arrangement in R&D Consortia the point of the fifth generation, a curve can be obtained that overlaps the other curve almost exactly. The second observation is the trajectory of performance improvement of each curve. In the early generations, performance under the inverse pyramid arrangement performs far exceeds that under the pyramid arrangement. In later generations, the pattern reverses. In the end, the pyramid arrangement far outperforms the inverse case. How can we explain this when there is no difference in average performance between the two arrangements? Observationally speaking, the increase or decrease in performance in each case corresponds to the number of firms in each generation. As the number of firms increases, performance increases, and vice versa. This pattern is due to the effect of diversity (i.e., the number of firms in each generation). As demonstrated in Section 4.2, a tension generally exists between diversity and selection. That is, as diversity increases in the consortium, the effectiveness of selection is reduced, and low-performing firms are gradually included. In the current case, however, selection relies on random chance, and diversity dominates the final results. Because selection is not useful, knowledge inflow from earlier generations does not enhance or deteriorate the current level of knowledge. Thus, no effect of knowledge transfer from earlier generations is evident. Performance indifference is the result (Fig. 5a ). The combination of the diversity effect and the lack of selection results in the performance pattern depicted in Fig. 5b ; as the number of firms increases in the pyramid case, maximum performance also increases. This pattern reverses for the inverse pyramid case. This result suggests a relationship between the evaluation capability of government and the timing of variation in innovation systems. When the government lacks evaluation capability or evaluation is unreliable, variation should be emphasized in the later stages of the innovation process.
Another important observation is the marginally decreasing benefit of diversity. In the pyramid case (Fig. 5b) , when the number of firms increases monotonically, the increase in performance from generation to generation is lower. In the inverse pyramid case, the decrease is largest in the last generations (graphically speaking, a mirror image of the pyramid case). This pattern helps in the interpretation of the results presented in the next section.
Early vs. continuous evaluation
Based on our understanding of the random evaluation case, we can examine more complex cases in which the timing of evaluation varies. First, we describe the exact difference between the early and continuous evaluation cases. Fig. 6 visually depicts this difference in the case in the pyramid arrangement when G = N = 5. In Fig. 6a , the early evaluation case, best-performing firms are selected based on their initial performance. For example, in the first generation, the best-performing firm is chosen; in the second generation, two other high performers are chosen. Between generations of selected firms, knowledge transmission takes place in a random manner. Red arrows represent random relationships.
In Fig. 6b , the continuous evaluation case, firms chosen in the previous generation pass down their knowledge to all firms in the next generation. Matching between generations is again random. For example, in the first generation, the best-performing firm is chosen and its knowledge is passed down to all five firms in the second generation. Evaluation takes place at this point for the second generation by choosing two other high performers. Fig. 7 reports the performance under the early evaluation scenario. Consider the average performance of a consortium in the pyramid arrangement (Fig. 7a ). The quality of knowledge passed down from an earlier generation monotonically decreases. Because the government now has increased accuracy in selection, the quality of chosen firms is no longer independent of the number of firms. Mid-to low-performing firms tend to be included as the number of
(a) Early Evaluation (b) Continuous Evaluation
Early vs. Continuous Evaluation: A Case of Pyramid Arrangement Fig. 6 . Early vs. continuous evaluation: a case of pyramid arrangement. Note: Red arrows represent random matching between generations. In (a), participating firms are chosen initially based on their initial performance. In (b), the chosen firms in the previous generation pass down their knowledge to all the firms in the next generation (based on random matching). Then, a fixed number of firms are chosen based on their current performance according to the arrangement plan.
firms in a generation increases. For example, the average knowledge quality is higher when a single best performer is chosen than when five best performers are chosen. Thus, diversity introduces less accuracy in the selection process. In a sense, there is a tension between diversity and selection.
The results presented in Fig. 7a , combined with the effect of diversity, can shed light on Fig. 7b , which depicts the tension between diversity and selection. Each curve exhibits an inverted U-pattern: performance peaks in the middle of each generational span. One way to interpret this pattern is to see it as a result of two opposing forces at work. In the pyramid arrangement, there is a performance-enhancing force that initially increases the performance level. However, due to the opposing force that brings the performance down, the performance level decreases over time. The performanceenhancing and -deteriorating forces are diversity and selection, respectively. To elucidate this tension, we consider the pyramid case first. As discussed at the end of Section 4.1, the benefit of diversity marginally decreases (see the pyramid curve in Fig. 5b) . The selection force, on the other hand, exhibits a linearly decreasing pattern (the pyramid curve in Fig. 7a ). The result of these two forces is the pyramid case in Fig. 7b . In the early stages, the effect of diversity dominates such that the resulting curve exhibits an increasing pattern. In later stages, when the marginal increase due to diversity is small, deterioration due to inaccurate selection dominates, and the resulting curve exhibits a decreasing pattern. The inverse pyramid case can also be understood by combining the two effects. However, the difference between the pyramid and the inverse pyramid case in Fig. 7b remains unexplained. The maximum performance in the inverse pyramid case seems lower than that in the pyramid arrangement. This difference may be attributed to the low quality of the initial knowledge passed down from one generation to the next in the inverse pyramid case. Not only the best-performing firm, but also all other firms in the first generation pass down their knowledge to the second generation. This is a significant difference from the pyramid case, in which only the best firm in the first generation passes down its knowledge.
In sum, performance patterns in both the pyramid and inverse pyramid cases are influenced by the conflicting forces of diversity and selection. Because these two forces tend to work in opposite directions, and the number of firms in a generation reflects the effects of these two forces, performance patterns in both arrangements tend to peak in midgeneration. Performance levels in consortia of the inverse pyramid type are much lower than for those of the pyramid type because of the low quality of initial knowledge. We believe that the early evaluation case is most representative of how real-world R&D consortia are formed. That is, participating firms are determined in the beginning stages, when collaboration is highest. From the results of the simulation presented here, we can conclude that a pyramid formation is a superior choice. When selection forces are prioritized in the early stages, the quality of overall knowledge transmitted in the system can be maximized. For this reason, a pyramid arrangement tends to generate better innovation outcomes. Fig. 8 reports the results in the continuous evaluation case. The maximum performance curve of the pyramid evaluation case is similar to that in the early evaluation case. The case of the inverse pyramid arrangement, however, is completely different. Instead of a performance decrease, the curve monotonically increases. In the early evaluation case, a decline in performance is evident in the inversepyramid case in later stages because of the lack of diversity as the number of firms decreases. This was also true in the random evaluation case. In the continuous evaluation case, however, the deteriorating effect of reduced diversity is weakened. To be more accurate, the effect of diversity is asymmetric: when the number of firms increases from one to two (i.e., generations one and two in the pyramid arrangement), the benefit of diversity is evident, as in the early 
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Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Fig. 7 . Early evaluation. Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. evaluation case; however, when the number decreases from two to one (i.e., generation nine and ten in the inverse pyramid arrangement), the loss of diversity does not hurt performance. The lack of deteriorating effect of reducing the number of firms in the inverse pyramid case is due to the continuous and open nature of evaluation. As noted earlier, the nature of continuous evaluation is to invite potential participants between generations, allowing openness and avoiding a closed system. Because the boundaries of the consortium are opened in the middle of the innovation process, lack of diversity is not a performance-deteriorating factor. Therefore, performance increases although the number of participating firms decreases over time in the inverse pyramid case. In the early evaluation case, we noted a tension between diversity and selection (the accuracy of selection decreases as the level of diversity increases). The results above suggest that, in the continuous evaluation case, this tension is resolved, at least in the inverse pyramid arrangement.
Early Evaluation
We admit that the continuous evaluation scenario is not frequently observed in the real world. However, our results suggest that (as demonstrated in Fig. 9 ) the highest performance is realized in the inverse pyramid case of continuous evaluation, as the tension between diversity and selection is resolved. Thus, if an inverse pyramid arrangement is employed and the quality of the final innovation output is considered, then opening the system in midgeneration to allow more firms to participate may be advantageous. The higher performance of a partially open innovation system compared to a closed system may be considered an obvious result. Yet the asymmetry of these two types of arrangement and the best outcome using the inverse pyramid arrangement may seem unintuitive.
In Fig. 9 , we attempt to draw a more general conclusion by answering two questions. The first question concerns the comparison between early versus continuous evaluation.
Comparing the first two and last two columns, we see that continuous evaluation yields better performance regardless of the arrangement. Note that the highest performance is realized in the scenario involving a combination of continuous evaluation and the inverse pyramid arrangement. This accords with the previous discussion about partial resolution of the tension between diversity and selection.
The second question concerns the comparison between the pyramid and inverse pyramid arrangements. The answer is less conclusive compared to that of the previous question. In the early evaluation case, the pyramid arrangement outperforms the inverse pyramid arrangement. In the continuous evaluation case, however, performance is better in the inverse case. Thus, we observe an interaction effect in performance ordering between the pyramid and inverse pyramid arrangements resulting from the timing of evaluation. This, again, is due to the partial resolution of the tension between diversity and selection in the continuous evaluation case. Since the tension is resolved only partially in the inverse pyramid arrangement, the once-low performance in the early evaluation case increases far more than in the late evaluation case, and performance ordering is reversed.
Early stage inaccuracy in perceived performance
In Fig. 10 , we report the results with early stage inaccuracy in perceived performance. We set s = 10 in the first generation and decrease it by one in each subsequent generation. Thus, in the last generation, there is no uncertainty in perceived performance. Results suggest that the general pattern in the final stage documented in the s = 1 case still remains: while the pyramid arrangement is superior in the early evaluation case, the inverse becomes dominant in the continuous evaluation case. Despite the consistent pattern, the performance trajectory differs for the early and Max Performance
Generations
Pyramid Inverse
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. continuous evaluation from the case with accurate performance feedbacks. The performance trajectory of the early evaluation ( Fig. 10(b) ) seems to be exactly the same as the random evaluation case (Fig. 10(a) ). This is not surprising because receiving accurate performance feedbacks in the early stage is quite difficult in the early evaluation case. In fact, with m = s = 10, the chance of receiving an accurate feedback is very low. It happens only when X ij perfectly matches the reality. Most firms the government chooses have zero performance. Thus, the evaluation process is not much more accurate from the random evaluation process, which results in the similar patterns between the two cases.
Continuous Evaluation
In the continuous evaluation case, the effect of early feedback inaccuracy is more nuanced. The key to understanding the result is to comprehend that early stage feedback inaccuracy impacts the benefit of selection (in particular, in early stages) while not influencing the benefit of diversity. In the previous case with accurate feedback (s = 1), the performance trajectory of the pyramid arrangement exhibited an inverted-U shape. The initial performance increase was due to accurate selection. Since we cannot expect this benefit under early stage feedback inaccuracy, the performance level is as low as the random evaluation case around 5. The subsequent performance increase is mostly due to the diversity effect. On the other hand, the inverse pyramid arrangement does not suffer from early feedback inaccuracy. It is because the consortium does not rely on selection in the early stages. By the time accurate selection plays a role in the previous case, the level of feedback accuracy increases. Thus, the overall pattern of the inverse pyramid arrangement does not differ dramatically from the previous case. In sum, when selection is completed in the beginning of a consortium, early feedback inaccuracy makes the selection process almost meaningless such that the performance pattern becomes similar to that from the random evaluation case. When selection is done continuously, the pyramid arrangement is most significantly influenced because it relies on early stage selection accuracy for performance increase.
Conclusion
We develop a computational model modified from genetic algorithms to model the innovation process in an R&D consortium by focusing on the coordinating role of the government. Two main roles of government explored in this study are the timing of evaluation of participating firms and the form of the consortium. In terms of evaluation timing, we find that continuous evaluation is consistently superior to early evaluation. However, the effect of the consortium arrangement depends on the timing of evaluation. Due to the nature of continuous evaluation, which compensates for lack of diversity, an inverse pyramid formation outperforms a pyramid formation under continuous evaluation.
The resulting patterns are mostly governed by the tension and reconciliation between diversity and selection. To balance the effects of diversity and selection accuracy effectively, the dominant force must be identified in various settings. In Table 1 , we summarize our findings in this area at different times of evaluation. The random and early evaluation cases were relatively simple; in terms of dominant force, there is no difference between the pyramid and inverse pyramid cases. However, in the continuous case, a marked difference is evident between the two cases. While a tension exists between diversity and selection in the pyramid case, no such tension Performance by Evaluation and Arrangement exists in the inverse pyramid case. In this case, selection is dominant not because the effect of diversity is absent, but because the effect of diversity is not sensitive to the decreasing number of firms.
Our results suggest several implications for both academic researchers and practitioners. Studying the effect of the timing of evaluation in R&D consortia opens up new possibilities in the planning and design of R&D consortia. Traditionally, an R&D consortium has been viewed as a closed system in which potential participants are evaluated and selected early on. Continuous evaluation, a hybrid form between open and closed systems, clearly outperforms the traditional method of formation of R&D consortia. Thus, when possible, experimenting with continuous evaluation in a real-world setting may be worthwhile. However, continuous evaluation may be more costly because more firms are involved (see Fig. 6 ) and the government must pay continuous attention. Despite these potential drawbacks, the performance benefit documented in the current study clearly exceeds that in the early evaluation case. If opening up consortium boundaries in every generation is difficult, continuous evaluation less frequently may be a feasible alternative.
The effect of the consortia arrangement also provides important implications from the VSR perspective. In particular, our results shed light on the question of how much variation should be sought early on in the artificial evolutionary process. Following the patterns of natural evolutionary systems and based on the results of descriptive studies that depict the innovation process (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) , many practitioners tend to emphasize variation early on. At the same time, however, successful innovation cases may be observed in latecomer countries in which variations were minimized. We provide information regarding boundary conditions and the efficacy of small versus large variation in the early stages of innovation. Our results suggest that minimal variation in the beginning can actually be more beneficial if the innovation system is open. Empirical validation of this insight as well as other factors that influence the efficacy of early variation may be examined in subsequent studies.
The current results reveal the tension and reconciliation between diversity and selection. Intuitively speaking, diversity and selection may be viewed as two sides of the same coin: more accurate selection reduces diversity, and more diversity implies less-than-optimal performance. Increasing the benefit of one force without sacrificing the benefit of the other seems to be a daunting task. Our results suggest possible scenarios in which these two forces can be decoupled.
The inverse pyramid arrangement under continuous evaluation is one such scenario. Towards the end of an innovation process, the negative effect of lack of diversity (i.e., a small number of firms) is avoided, while the benefits of more accurate selection may still be enjoyed. Periodic opening of the system allows other firms to adopt and develop innovation throughput from earlier generations. Making the innovation system partially open resolves the tension between diversity and selection by reducing the negative effects of the lack of diversity.
Finally, our results suggest the importance of a coordinator in an innovation system. While the role of government in R&D consortia is the focus of the current study, the results can be applied to other areas of interest. The competitive environment is often too fierce to allow the evolutionary system to unfold naturally by itself. Some type of intervention is often necessary to support innovation. As in a natural evolutionary system, artificial (i.e., human) intervention can have disastrous consequences. We hope that the results of our study can improve understanding of how an artificial evolutionary system such as an R&D consortium responds to intervention. 
